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We show that for a spatially differentiated economy reduced product variety is the likely 
outcome of mergers except in cases where exit costs in relation to (outlet-specific) fixed costs 
are high. Our empirical analysis of the Austrian retail gasoline market confirms that increases 
in concentration reduce product variety. Ignoring this product variety effect is likely to lead to 
an underestimate of market power in structural merger analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Mergers in spatially differentiated industries are likely to affect product variety. If potential 
entry matters, mergers may lead to an increase in product variety as shown by Berry and 
Waldvogel (2001). They find that the consolidation in radio broadcasting following the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996 led to an increase in product variety measured by the number 
of programming formats. However, examples such as mergers among retail banks show that 
mergers may also reduce the number of branches.
1  
  We present theoretical examples for a spatially differentiated economy, which show 
that reduced product variety is a likely outcome of mergers if barriers to entry are high. This 
holds except in cases where exit costs are high in relation to (outlet specific) fixed costs. In 
the empirical analysis, we examine the effect of concentration on product variety in the 
Austrian retail gasoline market. This market is ideal for testing our hypothesis. First, it 
exhibits a number of the particular characteristics of a spatially differentiated industry.
2 
Second, entry hardly matters, as Figure 1 shows. The number of stations is steadily decreasing 
over time, and de-novo entry is nearly absent. 
                                                 
1 After the merger of Bank Austria and Creditanstalt AG in Austria, 70 of the 470 bank 
branches of the combined firm were closed in 2002. 
2 See Pinkse et al. (2002).  3





























































Third, there is considerable merger activity in the market as one can see, for instance, from 
the large change in the market share of the Majors
3 from 1993 to 1994 (see Figure 1). In that 
year OMV AG took over the independent discounter STROH, which operated about 100 
stations. Finally, relocation costs are likely to be prohibitive, and exit costs are substantial 
(see Netz and Taylor, 2002). 
  These characteristics are not specific to Austria. For example, in Germany only 12,000 
out of the currently 16,000 gasoline stations are viable in the long run according to industry 
lobbyists. The association of the Majors (Mineralölwirtschaftsverband) and the association of 
the independents (Verband der Freien Tankstellen) together applied on July 10
th, 2001, at the 
German antitrust authority (Bundeskartellamt) for authorisation of the establishment of a 
                                                 
3 The six largest oil companies, OMV AG, BP Austria AG, Shell, Esso, Agip and ARAL, are 
called the Majors.  4
structural crisis cartel (Strukturkrisenkartell). The goal of the cartel is to support the exit of 
unprofitable outlets by paying a kind of wreck premium. The payments are to be financed by 
a surcharge on the wholesale price for all stations. Since the antitrust authority opposes the 
proposal, mergers might be a device to at least partially avoid what the lobbyists call 
"structural adjustment via a price war".
4 
  Our theoretical examples account for these special features, and our empirical analysis 
of the Austrian retail gasoline market confirms that increases in concentration reduce product 
variety (as measured by the number of stations per sqkm). This relation depends on consumer 
density, and is always negative, except in areas with very low consumer density where no 
relation between concentration and station density is found. The ratio of exit to fixed costs is 
likely to be high in these sparsely populated regions, since fixed costs are lower due to lower 
real estate prices, while exit costs (particularly if they consist mainly of cleaning up costs) are 
independent of population density. 
  Our result that more concentrated markets display less product variety has 
implications for "structural" analyses in empirical industrial organization. Such studies 
combine assumptions on the pricing behavior of firms with a demand model, which identifies 
market conduct and thus market power.
5 They neglect a key feature of market power in 
                                                 
4 The head of the Bundeskartellamt explicitly stated that the recent merger of two majors (BP 
and ARAL) will lead to closures of stations anyway. See FTD.DE, 25.7.2001, 
"Wettbewerbshüter gegen Tankstellenkartell". FAZ.net, 28.3.2001, "Immer weniger 
Tankstellen". Bundesverband Freier Tankstellen, 28.3.2001, "Aktuelles: Interview mit Herrn 
Müller: Markt für freie Tankstellen wird enger". 
5 See Baker and Bresnahan (1985), Nevo (2000), Ivaldi et al. (2002), Ivaldi and Verboven 
(2002), Genesove and Mullin (1998). For an early survey see Bresnahan (1989).  5
differentiated markets, namely that a merger between formerly competing firms may change 
product variety. Compared to much of the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Pepall et al., 2002, 
Heywood et al. 2001) our paper explicitly accounts for closure of outlets and examines 
possible cost synergies in greater detail.  
The next section presents our theoretical examples, Section 3 covers the empirical analysis, 
and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical examples 
Consider a variant of the traditional Salop (1979) model of a circular city. Consumers are 
located uniformly on a circle with a perimeter equal to 1. Density and total population is 
normalized to 1. For a consumer whose location and most preferred variety is  ˆ x, the 
(indirect) utility from consuming a good which is sold at a price pi at location xi is 
  ()
2
ˆ ˆ xii Ua t x x p =− − − .  
The distance (xi -  ˆ x) is measured by the smallest arc length between xi and  ˆ x. Locations xi 
and  ˆ x are measured by the clockwise arc length between noon and the respective location. 
The (common) reservation price a is assumed to be large so that all consumers will always 
buy a product. We choose the indices of the outlets in a way that outlet i is located to the left 
of outlet j, i.e.  ij x x < , if ij < . The consumer α who is indifferent between buying at i and j 














                                                 
6 Note that we denote the consumer who is indifferent between the first firm and the n
th firm, 
which is to the right of it, as αn,1.  6
If prices are such that the market share of all outlets is positive, demand for outlet i equals 
,1 ,1 ii i i i D −+ =α +α .  
  We analyse the effects of mergers and concentration in a framework in which - at most 
- three firms are active. We assume that each operates only one outlet. In the case of a merger 
of (at most) two of the three firms, the combined firm may either run one or two outlets. We 
allow explicitly for the exit of one outlet. With respect to locations we assume that outlets are 
located equidistantly in the three outlet case (i.e., at 0, 1/3, and 2/3). 
 
2.1. Three single product firms 
The profit function of firm i reads 
  ii i i p Df Π= − ,  i = 1,2,3.   
where fi denotes firm i's fixed costs. Marginal costs are normalized to zero. Straightforward 
calculations yield the symmetric equilibrium price p = t/9 and profits  /27 ii tf π= −   
 
2.2. Merger: equilibrium with three outlets 
The case of a merger between firms 1 and 2 that does not lead to outlet closure is depicted in 







Figure 2: Circular model when firms 1 and 2 merge  7
 
The combined firm’s profit function reads 
  11 22 1 2 m p Dp Dff Π= + − −     








pq == π = .  
The respective values for the outsider are  
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pq == π = .  
The merger leads to higher prices as the merging firms internalize part of the business stealing 
implied by the quest for higher market share. Since the outsider responds to the price increase 
by increasing its own price by less than the combined firm, prices are unequal in equilibrium. 
The merging firms jointly gain 7t/243 in total operating profits. That is, even without cost 
reducing synergies the merger is profitable. The profit gain of the outsider is also 7t/243, 
twice the gain of a merging firm. The profit increase of the outsider is due to both the increase 
in prices and the increase of its market share. The latter point is obvious from Figure 2, the 
indifferent consumers (α2,3 and α3,1) are now located closer to the outlets of the combined 
firm compared to the case with three independent firms.  
 
2.3. Merger: equilibrium with two outlets 
If the merging firms decide to close one outlet, we can distinguish two cases: a scenario with 
costless relocation and one in which relocation is (prohibitively) costly. Since the principle of 
maximum product differentiation applies in our framework, in the first case the outlet of the 
merging firm would be located at a distance of 1/2 from the outsider. We obtain an 
equilibrium price of t/4 in this case. Operating profits are t/8.  8






Figure 3: Circular model when the merging firm closes outlet 2 (no relocation) 
 
Now both firms charge a price of 2t/9. The firms’ profits are t/9. Although the firms share the 
market evenly (α1,3  and  α3,1 are located half-way between the two competitors), price 
competition is tougher and profits are lower than in the case of (costless) relocation. This is 
due to the absence of maximum product differentiation as is apparent from Figure 3. 
 
2.4. Merger: A combined firm with one or two outlets? 
In order to determine the optimum number of outlets, we must be more specific about how 
(fixed) costs change in the case of a merger. The result is straightforward in the case of 
costless relocation (i.e., maximum product differentiation in the two outlet case). Operating 
profits are higher in the case of outlet closure by t(1/8 – 25/243) = 43t/1944. Since the fixed 
costs of the merged entity should at least not be higher if it operates one rather than two 
outlets, closing one outlet is always profitable if relocation is costless. This result is an 
application of the result concerning non-optimality of multiple outlets in Martinez-Giralt and 
Neven (1988).  
  The result that operating profits of the merging firms are higher with one rather than 
two outlets holds also in the case without costless relocation. The difference in profits is 
2t/243. This value is much smaller than in the case of costless relocation, it amounts to less  9
than ten percent of the operating profits. To derive the optimum number of outlets in the case 
without costless relocation, we distinguish three cases.  
 
1. All potential reductions in fixed costs are realized due to the merger per se, that is without 
closure of an outlet. Post-merger fixed costs are equal to f in this case if the merging firms 
operate two outlets.
7 Since closure of an outlet yields only the (small) gain in operating 
profits, the existence of small exit costs is sufficient to make two outlets the optimum choice. 
 
2. Fixed costs do not change due to the merger unless an outlet is closed. In this case only exit 
costs which are greater than the fixed costs would leave the number of outlets unaffected. 
 
3. Parts of the potential cost reductions are realized by the merger without closure of outlets. 
Suppose that a part of the fixed costs is outlet specific, while the remaining fixed costs are 
firm specific. The latter costs may be driven by factors such as advertising. In this case the 
decision on how many outlets to run depends crucially on the relation of outlet specific fixed 
costs to the exit costs, which are specific to the outlet as well. 
 
Summing up the examples, we conclude that mergers are likely to lead to a reduced number 
of outlets unless exit costs are high in relation to (outlet specific) fixed costs. 
 
3. The data and results 
To substantiate this hypothesis we analyse the effects of market concentration on the density 
of gasoline stations in Austria. We assembled a comprehensive list of gasoline stations in 
                                                 
7 Pepall et al. (2002) also assume that cost structure.   10
Austria as of the beginning of 2001.
8 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive list of stations 
available from a single source, therefore we had to construct a list from the sources Statistik 
Austria (Austrian Statistical Office), the ÖAMTC (an Austrian automobile club), and 
information provided by the petroleum companies (in the order of their market shares) OMV 
AG, BP Austria AG, SHELL, ESSO, AGIP and ARAL. Thus, we could localize 2,856 
gasoline stations in Austria by address (zip code and address). Additionally, we know the 
name of the oil company operating the stations or whether the station is operated by an 
independent retailer. According to the Fachverband der Mineralölindustrie (Association of 
the Petroleum Industry in Austria), there were 2,957 operating gasoline stations in Austria as 
of the beginning of 2001, thus our list covers 96.6% of all gasoline stations in Austria. 
  A rather difficult problem is the delineation of local gasoline markets and the 
definition of “regions”. Austria consists of nine federal states subdivided into 121 districts, 
which consist of roughly 2,400 municipalities (i.e. zipcode level). We use the districts as 
relevant regions. This choice compromises on the market definition being too narrow (should 
we have based it on zip codes, etc.) or too wide (if we took federal states). 
  For each of the 121 districts, we calculate the density of gasoline stations Sk (= number 
of stations per sqkm in district k), population density Dk (= number of inhabitants per sqkm), 
the Herfindahl index HERFk (= squared sum of market shares of all firms operating in district 
k), and the four-firm concentration measure C4k (= sum of market shares of four largest 
firms). 
  Several features of the data set are worth mentioning. First, our model of section 2 
assumes product differentiation, i.e. stations do not (perfectly) cluster in one location, since 
price competition would drive profits to zero. This is what we actually observe in the data. 
                                                 
8 Thus we analyse a cross section of markets as Berry and Waldvogel (2001).  11
For example, in nearly 60% of the zipcode areas with stations, there is only one station. 
Second, we use the number of gasoline stations rather than output or sales as the basis to 
calculate concentration figures. This has the advantage that our measures of concentration are 
less subject to the kind of endogeneity problems mentioned by Evans et al. (1993).
9 Finally, 
Table 1, Panel A, presents summary statistics. On average, the patch of a service station is 
31.4 sqkm (=1/S). The average C4 is 65.4% and the average HERF is 16.8%, with a wide 
range from 6 to 100%. 
 
 
Table 1: Results 
Panel A: Summary statistics over 121 districts 
          
 Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Minimum   Maximum
km²/station 31.39  29.04 26.87 0.30 113.28
Inhabitants/km² 2039.23  89.26 4988.82 21.11 26028.63
Herfindahl 16.77  14.05 12.54 5.87 100.00
C4 65.35  62.50 13.60 35.71 100.00
 
 
                                                 
9 Concentration-price regressions suffer mainly from two sources of bias: first, concentration 
normally is a function of endogenous firm outputs or revenues. Second, performance feeds 
back into market structure, that is concentration causes price, but price also causes 
concentration. In this paper we look, however, at the concentration-density nexus, which 
should suffer much less from endogeneity.  12
Panel B: Regression results 
          
Dependent  variable:  ln(stations/km²)        
 
Independent variables: 
       
 OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS 
  Coef  t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value Coef t-value 
ln(Inhabitants/km²)  0.835  49.01 1.174 13.08 1.840  6.10  1.580  7.59 
ln(HERF) -0.306  -3.79  0.426  2.07      1.081  1.76 
ln(C4)         0.803  1.77     
ln(Inhabitants)*ln(HERF)      -0.118 -3.84      -0.253 -3.34 
ln(Inhabitants)*ln(C4)        -0.237  -3.34    
Constant  -6.319  -30.95 -8.375 -14.72  -10.551 -5.55 -10.326 -6.31 
            
No.  Obs.  121    121  121  121  
R²-adjusted  0.957    0.962  0.960  0.954  
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the regression results. Specification 1 shows that population 
density (positively) and market concentration (negatively) affect station density. The 
coefficient on lnDk of 0.84 (t = 49.01) implies that for each percentage increase in the number 
of inhabitants per sqkm the number of gasoline stations increases by around 0.8 percent per 
sqkm. This conforms to predictions of models of spatial competition that the number of 
outlets increases less than proportional to consumer density, since the greater proximity of 
shops increases competition between them and thus reduces the equilibrium price. The 
negative and significant coefficient on lnHERFk suggests that increases in concentration, e.g. 
via mergers, induce exit of stations. The adjusted R² is more than 95%. 
  Specification 2 includes an interaction term of lnDk and lnHERFk. The negative and 
significant coefficient estimate on this interaction term implies that the negative (exit-
inducing) effects of higher concentration increase with population density. We estimate that 
increases in concentration induce exit of stations in all districts except for the 10% districts 
with the lowest population density. Therefore, the largest exit-inducing effects of increasing 
concentration are witnessed in cities. This is consistent with fixed costs relative to exit costs 
being highest in cities, since high property prices in cities imply that outside opportunities for 
the station owner, e.g. alternative uses of the station area, are good.  13
  Specification 3 replaces HERF with C4, with no change in (qualitative) results. On the 
contrary, the interaction term of lnDk and lnC4k affects station density even more negatively, 
consistent with C4 being able to measure oligopolistic interaction. 
  Finally, specification 4 instruments the Herfindahl index as well as the interaction 
term with variables proxying for differential cost and demand conditions, and estimates by 
2SLS. The instruments include nine federal state dummies, the overall number of cars as well 
as the number of cars per inhabitant in district k, the average income level in district k, and the 
area share of alps and wood in district k. These instruments strike us to be plausible 
determinants of market concentration, and yet are exogenous to station density for sure. Cost 
and demand conditions systematically affect concentration: For example, a larger market size 
or lower fixed costs lead to a less concentrated market structure in most models of IO. Also 
the regulatory environment varies across the nine federal states in Austria, which may affect 
market concentration.
10 The qualitative results are unaltered, however, using 2SLS, the 
interaction term is even more negative than in the corresponding OLS regression. Therefore, 
possible endogeneity of concentration does not drive our results. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We find that more concentrated markets in spatially differentiated industries display less 
product variety. This negative effect of market concentration is present in nearly all markets 
except in very sparsely populated markets. This suggests that fixed entry and exit costs are 
key determinants of the effects of market concentration on product variety. 
                                                 
10 For example, environmental legislation differs across federal states, which affects fixed 
costs.  14
  Our findings have important implications for empirical merger analysis. The structural 
analysis of the effects of mergers should account for changes in product variety. Using pre-
merger outlet-specific data to estimate the elasticity of demand, and ignoring the possibility 
that outlets could be closed due to the merger, underestimates market power of the remaining 
outlets. Mergers are likely to have both, price and product variety effects. 
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